There has been a strong sense in the accounting profession in recent years that Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) has been in a bit of a mess. More often than not, it seems, ordinary taxpayers have received the wrong tax code and more technical taxation disputes involving business customers have been taking forever, and several changes of HMRC staff of course, to resolve.
Now it is possible to gain more of an inside view of the tax office courtesy of the National Audit Office (NAO). Its report on the 2010-11 accounts of HMRC makes very revealing reading. The report analyses, not always favourably, various aspects of the work of the tax man. For instance HMRC has to administer the tax credits scheme. This, apparently, has been an utter disaster leading to an ultimate horror of a qualified audit report because a substantial amount of public money has been lost. Unfortunately the total amount of the losses for 2010-11 is not yet available but, “the Department estimates that in 2009‑10 it overpaid between £1.75 billion and £2.14 billion to tax credits claimants due to error and fraud”. Perhaps this is no surprise? After all, the whole system of tax credits is a relatively recent and somewhat ill-conceived political invention so HMRC does have an excuse.
Other failings, though, seem rather less easy to forgive. The report sets out the background of historic difficulties with the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system, “The increasing complexity of employments and pensions made it more difficult for it to administer individuals’ tax affairs without some degree of manual working. In recent years, the number of cases requiring manual intervention exceeded its capacity to clear them, leading to backlogs in processing and uncertainty for those individuals with unresolved tax liabilities.” The tax man’s answer to these problems was a new ‘National Insurance and PAYE Service’ (NPS) launched in June 2009. Intended to clear the Revenue’s backlog automatically, the new computer did exactly the opposite. The report uses civil service language to describe the meltdown that ensued, “The Department encountered a number of operational challenges in 2009-10 following the introduction of NPS….It also led the Committee of Public Accounts to conclude that the Department had failed in its duty to process PAYE accurately and on time, and deliver an acceptable standard of service to PAYE taxpayers.”
All water under the bridge now since “the Department has made significant progress in stabilising its administration of PAYE during 2010-11″ except that another similar disaster seems to be waiting around the corner: “the planned introduction of Real Time Information (RTI) for PAYE in 2013 and the Department for Work and Pensions’ reliance on this information to deliver the new Universal Credit”. To add to the fear that HMRC will be in no position to implement a new system that involves a vast increase in the volume of data that it is handling the report helpfully reminds us that “the Department plans to reduce the headcount in its Personal Tax business area from some 24,900 currently to around 16,400 by April 2015″.
The NAO should not criticise government policy so it only advises the Department “to thoroughly test the adequacy of its plans”. Testing, though, may well simply confirm that HMRC will not be able to cope with yet another huge change in its computer systems at the same time as a drastic reduction in staff. In that case one or other plan, or possibly both, will need to be scrapped.